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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the full cycle of political power transitions and the dynamics of
party competition during the 2016 parliamentary and 2017 presidential elections in
Mongolia. It argues that the existence of multiple interlinked patronage networks and
factionalism explains the persistence of the electoral democracy in Mongolia. The
article focuses on the internal politics of the Democratic Party.
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IT WAS PAST MIDNIGHT ON THE NIGHT of June 30, 2016. The speaker of the
Mongolian parliament, Zandankhuu Enkhbold, stood behind the podium in
the brightly lit lobby of the Youth Hotel, which had served as the headquar-
ters for the Democratic Party’s (DP’s) election campaign. Surrounded by
a crowd of journalists, an ashen-faced, visibly broken Enkhbold announced
his party’s acceptance of the results: ‘‘The Mongolian people have made their
choice.’’ Down the road, the opposition Mongolian People’s Party (MPP)
celebrated victory: they had won 65 of the parliament’s 76 seats, leaving
the Democrats—the ruling party—with only nine. One other seat went the
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), and one to an
independent.
Within days the DP relinquished its hold on power. The MPP’s leader,
Miyegombo Enkhbold (no relation to Z. Enkhbold) became the new
speaker, while his party colleagues scrambled to take over the cabinet. The
only thing that stood in the way of the MPP’s complete political control was
the fact that the president, Tsakhia Elbegdorj, had been afﬁliated with the
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DP. But he had only a year left in ofﬁce. The Democrats, defeated and
demoralized, seemed incapable of making a comeback. But a year later, they
did. In the acrimoniously fought race in June–July 2017, the DP nominee,
Khaltmaa ‘‘Genko’’ Battulga, defeated the MPP supremo, M. Enkhbold, and
the DP regained some of the ground it had lost to the MPP a year earlier.
The DP’s 2016 defeat at the polls, followed by the MPP’s unexpected
reversal in 2017, are generally in line with Mongolia’s political developments
over the last quarter of a century. Indeed, since Mongolia adopted its present
constitution, in 1992, the country has successfully held seven parliamentary
and seven presidential elections. Several of these entailed a transfer of power
between two major parties. All but one (the parliamentary election of 2008)
were peaceful, including the last two elections. Democracy appears to be an
unalienable and unchallenged element of the country’s political reality.
Yet Mongolia would appear ill-suited for democratic governance. The
landlocked country is surrounded by Russia and China, neither of which
shows much of a penchant for democratic politics. Scholars of democratiza-
tion have described Mongolia as an exceptional case.1 This sentiment has
been echoed by policymakers such as former US Secretary of State John
Kerry, who called Mongolia, poetically, an ‘‘oasis of democracy.’’2 Mongolia
is not an easy ﬁt for any of the existing models of democratization. Its
economic development is heavily tilted toward resource exploitation, with
all the consequences of the ‘‘resource curse.’’3 It is one of the poorest countries
of the former Soviet bloc, with high income inequality. It does not border on
democratic countries, limiting prospects for a democratic ‘‘spillover.’’4 Fur-
thermore, Mongolia is not tied into a Western-led security system such as
1. Steven M. Fish, ‘‘The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia’s Democratization in Comparative
Perspective,’’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34:3 (2001): 323–38; Renske Doorenspleet and
Petr Kopecky´, ‘‘Against the Odds: Deviant Cases of Democratization,’’ Democratization 15:4 (2008):
697–713; Michael Seeberg, ‘‘Mapping Deviant Democracy,’’ Democratization 21:4 (2014): 634–54.
2. Remarks by John Kerry in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, June 5, 2016.
3. Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘‘Social Prerequisites of Democracy Revisited,’’ American Sociological
Review (1959): 69–105; Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, ‘‘Endogenous Democratization,’’ World
Politics 55:4 (2003): 517–49; Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1997); Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2008); Michael Ross, ‘‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy?’’ World Politics (2001): 325–61.
4. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold
War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad:
The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
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NATO. By all expectations, democratic Mongolia should not be there. And
yet, there it is: in one considered opinion, a ‘‘miracle.’’5
To be sure, there are explanations. One of the most convincing points to
the existence of a strong parliament (the State Ikh Khural), which constrains
the powers of the presidency. There is a correlation between robust democ-
racies and a powerful parliament; Mongolia, on this account, is fortunate to
have a constitution that empowers the legislature and provides a series of
checks and balances that other countries in the region lack. The difﬁculty
with the institutional argument—as presented by Stephen Fish and others—
is the assumption that a strong legislature prevents the subversion of the
democratic process.6
Coming from a different angle, Verena Fritz argues that the success of
Mongolia’s democratization has to do with a mixture of structural factors
(including Buddhism, nomadism, weak clan structures, and ethnic homoge-
neity) and conjunctural factors like political-party dominance (rather than
charismatic leadership) and dependence on foreign aid.7 However, many of
these factors are overstated (for instance, nomadism, ethnic homogeneity,
and dependence on foreign aid) or even romanticized (as with regard to
traditions of statehood or Buddhist practices). Moreover, it is very difﬁcult
to actually document how these various factors contribute to the democratic
outcome.
Most recently, Fish and Seeberg have contended that ‘‘the key to the
success of Mongolia’s democracy lies in its powerful civil society.’’8 However,
one could also argue that civil society and its various attributes (for instance,
the proliferation of NGOs and the existence of ‘‘independent,’’ i.e. non-state,
media) are a corollary, not a prerequisite, of democratic politics.
5. Jorgen Moller, Post-Communist Regime Change: a Comparative Study (London: Routledge,
2009), 137.
6. Steven M. Fish, ‘‘The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia’s Democratization in Comparative
Perspective,’’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001): 323–38; M. Steven Fish, ‘‘The
Dynamics of Democratic Erosion,’’ in Richard D. Anderson, ed., Postcommunism and The Theory
of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001): 54–95; Juan J. Linz, ‘‘The Perils of
Presidentialism 1990,’’ Journal of Democracy 1:1 (Winter 1990): 51–69; Taeko Hiroi and Sawa Omori,
‘‘Perils of Parliamentarism?’’ Democratization 16:3 (2009): 485–507.
7. Verena Fritz, ‘‘Mongolia: Dependent Democratization,’’ Journal of Communist Studies and
Transition Politics 4 (2002): 75–100.
8. Steven M. Fish and Michael Seeberg, ‘‘The Secret Supports of Mongolian Democracy,’’
Journal of Democracy 28:1 (2017): 129.
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There is thus a need for an alternative explanation. In this article, we argue
that the key feature that helps explain the Mongolian ‘‘aberration’’ is the
existence of multiple interlinked patronage networks and rife factionalism,
which causes dispersal of political power.9 These networks exist quite apart
from the weak institutional checks and balances, but they serve as real con-
straints on claims to power by preventing the emergence of a single leader.
We take a close look at the dynamics of party competition during the 2016–17
electoral cycle, which included the June 2016 parliamentary elections and the
June 2017 presidential elections, to argue that factionalism hurt the political
parties but inadvertently helped Mongolia’s democracy. The article focuses
mainly on the internal politics of the DP, because its factionalism is much
more pronounced than that of the rival MPP.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Mongolia’s DP has a lengthy experience of defeats at the polls. The party’s
origins go back to the 1990 Democratic Revolution, and many of its key
players began their political careers as youthful revolutionaries, vying for the
overthrow of the communist system. In the 1990s various political forces that
would later form the DP aligned and realigned in short-lived coalitions. In
1996 the Democratic Union Coalition allowed the Democrats to capture
power for the ﬁrst time in a landslide election that gave them 51 out of 76
parliamentary seats. But the coalition’s rule proved short-lived. Four prime
ministers came and went in as many years, amid economic malaise and
deepening controversy over privatization of state assets. The 1998 assassina-
tion of a prominent Democratic politician, Sanjaasuren Zorig, highlighted
the depth of the political instability and set the stage for the Democrats’
complete rout in the next parliamentary elections. In 2000 the MPRP won 72
seats with slightly over 50% of the popular vote.
The Democrats’ answer to this defeat was political consolidation. In 2000,
ﬁve political parties formed a united Democratic Party. The beneﬁts of
presenting a united front against the MPRP helped the Democrat-led
Motherland-Democratic coalition win 36 seats in 2004, tying the MPRP.
As a result, the two main parties agreed to have a coalition government and
9. This article is based on dozens of informal conversations between the authors and various party
insiders from the DP, MPP, and MPRP. Due to sensitivity, identities cannot be disclosed. We strove
to independently verify all claims through open sources.
RADCHENKO AND JARGALSAIKHAN / THE BLESSINGS OF PATRONAGE IN MONGOLIA  1035
rotate prime ministers every two years. The year 2004 was the beginning of
a new phase in Mongolian politics that would last until 2015. For just over
a decade the two main parties worked together in coalition governments,
giving rise to allegations of political collusion that stiﬂed real democracy.
While the hung parliament formed after the 2004 election ostensibly
justiﬁed the creation of a grand coalition, this was a less obvious choice in
2008, when the MPRP clawed back some of the lost ground, winning
46 seats. Yet instead of establishing a strong majority government checked
by a strong opposition, the MPRP offered six government positions to the
DP, in part to alleviate tensions following the post-elections riots on July 1,
2008, when ﬁve people were killed and the MPRP headquarters was burned
down. It was also important to distribute responsibility, for in the run-up to
the 2008 parliamentary elections both the MPRP and the DP made a priori
unrealizable promises of cash distribution to the electorate. Finally, the
‘‘grand coalition’’ allowed a measure of cooperation in the passing of a major
investment agreement for the copper-gold deposit at Oyu Tolgoi and the
tender for the coal deposit at Tavan Tolgoi.
In 2010, halfway through the coalition government, the MPRP reinvented
itself as the Mongolian People’s Party, shedding the adjective ‘‘revolution-
ary.’’ As a consequence, the ideological distance between the two main parties
narrowed even more. Combining the Mongolian names for the MPP (man)
and DP (an), clever observers called this new equilibrium manan, or ‘‘fog.’’
The implication was that the Mongolian democracy was not a democracy at
all but a mere oligarchic consensus to rule and share the spoils. The grand
coalition fell apart in January 2012 but was brieﬂy revived in 2014–15, when
six MPP members joined the cabinet of DP Prime Minister Chimed
Saikhanbileg.
Then, in 2012, the DP regained the majority with 34 seats, a few short
of the 39 required for the establishment of a one-party cabinet. One
signiﬁcant development that preceded this victory was the election of
a long-time DP leader, Elbegdorj, as Mongolian president. Elbegdorj,
who was nominated by the DP, relinquished his party afﬁliation on
assuming the presidency, but this formality in no sense eroded the reality
of the DP’s political dominance. Harvard-educated, ostensibly liberal
Elbegdorj, whose support for the democratic cause went back to his days
as a leader of the 1990 revolution, wasted no time in consolidating his
power over the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General’s Ofﬁce, and law
1036  ASIAN SURVEY 57:6
enforcement agencies such as the Independent Authority against Corrup-
tion (IAAC).
Elbegdorj’s decision to appoint Tsevegmid Zorig chief justice of the
Supreme Court likely inﬂuenced the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision to allow
a new party, led by former President Nambar Enkhbayar, to adopt the name
of the recently discarded Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, the polit-
ical ancestor of the MPP. The decision was naturally and vehemently
opposed by the MPP for the obvious reason that the ‘‘new’’ MPRP would
split their vote, which is in fact what happened in 2012 and again in the 2017
elections. By the same token, the IAAC decision to arrest Enkhbayar for
corruption two months before the elections may be interpreted as politically
motivated, as Enkhbayar himself repeatedly claimed. There is no proof that
Elbegdorj had a direct say in the decision of the Supreme Court, or that
politics played any role in the IAAC decision. But the timing of these moves
suggests a pattern implicating the ruling party.
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
There is an intricate relationship between political power and political legit-
imacy.10 Given the choice, even the meanest of autocrats seek to legitimize
their rule by improving the livelihood of the people. As long as the economy
continues to grow, even unelected rulers enjoy a degree of political legiti-
macy, and those who resort to elections happily embrace the electoral cycle,
with its promise of inevitable return to power and a new bout of legitimacy.
Problems begin when economic growth ﬁzzles out and stagnation or perhaps
recession set in. In immature democracies this is the moment when the
power-holders must make a choice: either follow through with the electoral
process and lose power or keep power by subverting the electoral process.
This is the point when a country can go forward toward a more robust
democracy or roll back to some form of authoritarian governance. Mongolia
reached this point by 2016–17.
Between 2012 and 2016 the country experienced a dramatic economic
slowdown. The fastest-growing economy in the world in 2011 (when its GDP
10. Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy,’’ American Political Science Review 53:1 (1959): 69–105; Samuel Huntington, The
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1991).
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expanded by a whopping 17.3%), Mongolia saw its growth rate slip to a mere
1% in 2016.11 Foreign direct investment nosedived, from US$ 4.4 billion in
2012 to US$ 800million in 2014.12 The government resorted to borrowing on
the international bond market. US$ 3.6 billion was raised this way between
2012 and 2016, including the US$ 1.5 billion raised from the issue of the
Chinggis bond in 2012. Domestic debt doubled in 2012–14, and by 2015
Mongolia’s debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 70%, shattering the debt ceiling.13
The general economic malaise was accompanied by soaring unemployment
(11.6% in the ﬁrst quarter of 2016).14
In addition to external factors, for example China’s economic slowdown
and the decline in the world prices of copper and coal (Mongolia’s key export
commodities), many wounds were self-inﬂicted. The mining boom encour-
aged construction, leading to wasteful spending on infrastructure and energy
projects. Megaprojects, like the massive industrial center at Sainshand and
a multimillion-dollar railroad link between the coal mine of Tavan Tolgoi
and the Chinese border, were just the tip of the iceberg. In the space of a few
years, the construction frenzy turned the capital city of Ulaanbaatar into
a glittering metropolis of empty ofﬁce and apartment blocks, and covered
the entire country with a ﬁne network of paved roads leading from nowhere
to nowhere. This record of waste, mismanagement of public funds, and
mounting debt contributed to the declining popularity of the DP, making
it likely that it would suffer at the polls. But few could have foreseen the
extent of its loss.
POLITICAL FACTIONALISM IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Before looking at how the DP sought to reverse its political fortunes, it is
useful to explore the party’s internal dynamics. The DP suffers from intense
11. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2016, <http://www.adb.org/countries/
mongolia/economy>, accessed September 15, 2016; World Bank, ‘‘Country Overview,’’ <http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?end¼2015&locations¼MN&start¼1982&view
chart> accessed September 1, 2016.
12. World Bank, ‘‘Foreign Direct Investment,’’ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.
DINV.CD.WD?locations¼MN>, accessed August 16, 2016.
13.William Bikales, ‘‘Mongolia Faces a Debt Crisis,’’Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2016, <http://
www.wsj.com/articles/mongolia-faces-a-debt-crisis-1470331031>, accessed August 10, 2016.
14. National Statistics Ofﬁce of Mongolia, <http://www.en.nso.mn/stat_main>, accessed
October 5, 2016. The ofﬁcial unemployment rates do not reﬂect underemployment and hidden
unemployment.
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factionalism. Its leaders are often more in competition among themselves
than with the rival MPP. The DP was established on the basis of an alliance
between disparate opposition parties and inﬂuential business and political
entrepreneurs, who are united by little more than their common opposition
to the MPP.15 The DP lacks an ideology. It is thus a classic example of what
Kitschelt would call a clientelistic (rather than programmatic) party.16 This
factionalism destabilized and weakened the ruling party but, interestingly,
actually contributed to the peaceful transfer of power.
One of the party’s most powerful factions is the Polar Star faction. It unites
former members of the Mongolian Social Democratic Party and has included
ﬁgures like Norov Altankhuyag (prime minister in 2012–14), Chimed
Saikhanbileg (prime minister in 2014–16), and the prominent politician
Sangajav Bayartsogt. In recent years the Polar Star faction played a key role
in forming coalition governments with the MPRP/MPP (in 2004 and 2008).
During the DP’s years as a ruling party, the Polar Star faction controlled the
cabinet and the DP’s National Consultative Committee. Observers attribute
the fall of Altankhuyag’s government in 2014 to a split within the faction
between Altankhuyag and his detractors Saikhanbileg and Bayartsogt. Such
backstabbing highlights the intensity of rivalries at the top of Mongolia’s
political Olympus, which play out mostly outside the framework of party-to-
party competition.
Another player in the DP is the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU)
faction. Dating back to the democratic movement of the late 1980s, at one
time or another it has included all 13 ‘‘founding fathers’’ of the democratic
revolution, including, most importantly, former President Elbegdorj
(2009–17). But more recently the MDU faction was monopolized by the
athlete-turned-businessman-turned-politician ‘‘Genko’’ Battulga. His
ample ﬁnancial means permitted Battulga to underwrite the faction’s needs.
The MDU faction went from having three members in Altankhuyag’s
cabinet to ﬁve members in the second cabinet of Saikhanbileg. Despite
being weakened by a conﬂict between Elbegdorj and Battulga, the MDU
faction became a base from which Battulga later captured power in the DP,
getting himself nominated to run for president.
15.OnDecember 6, 2000, the Democratic Party, the Mongolian National Progressive Party, and
the Mongolian Social Democratic Party merged under the name of the Democratic Party.
16. Herbert Kitschelt, ‘‘Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies,’’ Party
Politics 1:4 (1995): 447–72.
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Another important group in the DP was the Shonkhor (Falcon) faction.
The falcon-in-chief was the former speaker (2012–16) Z. Enkhbold, who
established the faction in 2012. The faction made its presence felt at the level
of the DP’s National Consultative Committee, where Enkhbold was able to
inﬂuence the allocation of places on the party’s electoral list. The last DP
cabinet (2014–16) included three members of the Shonkhor faction. The
faction provided a rallying point for DP members who were opposed to
the more powerful factions and wanted to increase their own inﬂuence in
the party. One example of the faction’s growing clout was the appointment of
Enkhbold as party chairman. This was a result of an agreement with the Polar
Star faction’s Altankhuyag, who, in return, got to appoint ‘‘his’’ prime min-
ister (Saikhanbileg), as insurance against investigation of Altankhuyag by the
powerful IAAC, which was backed by President Elbegdorj of the rival MDU
faction.17
There are deep links between political and business interests. Business
visibly entered Mongolian politics in 1996 (in the DP’s case) and 2000 (in
the MPP, in its earlier reincarnation as the MPRP). In the 1996 parliamentary
campaign the Democrats sought out entrepreneurs both to fund their cam-
paign activities and to attract qualiﬁed cadres to ﬁll party ofﬁces. The party
also promoted businessmen who had already joined its ranks. Lu. Bold,
a former banker and a current MP, is a good example. But by 2000 entre-
preneurs were increasingly joining both major political parties, the DP and
the MPRP. The fact that the MPRP was a successor to the Communist Party,
retained the adjective ‘‘revolutionary’’ in its name, and adhered to a compar-
atively left-leaning ideology did not at all prevent a certain degree of ‘‘com-
mercialization’’ of the party: campaign politics, after all, requires money.
Political parties in Mongolia are seen as a gateway for entrepreneurs to tap
the state resources through tenders and loans, to disadvantage their compe-
titors, to oppose higher taxes, and to seek protection from criminal investi-
gation. The availability of cash (in the form of the Chinggis and Samurai
bonds) generated unprecedented business involvement in politics. Unsurpris-
ingly, business people rarely invest in the smaller political parties: they back
one of the two bigger players, DP or MPP. Ideologies matter very little in this
process; business bids on the likely winners. Thus, the businessmen Batsukh
Narankhuu and Dashjamts Arvin and the wrestler Agvaansamdan Sukhbat
17. Authors’ discussion with DP insiders.
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are said to have switched their party afﬁliations on the basis of the parties’
electoral chances. In the few cases when business people are unable to secure
positions in either the DP or MPP, they start political parties of their own
(e.g., Bazarsad Jargalsaikhan, the founder and long-time leader of the Repub-
lican Party; Lamjav Gundalai, the chair of the Love the Motherland Party).
Even more curious is the practice of business families’ acquiring footing with
both the DP and the MPP. For instance, in the 2012–16 parliament, MPs
Batsukh Saranchimeg and Batsukh Narankhuu (sister and brother) repre-
sented the MPP and the DP, respectively. The Mongolian sumo champion
and multimillionaire Asashoryu is afﬁliated with the DP, whereas his brother,
MP Dolgorsuren Sumiyabazar, is with the MPP. The Mongolian business
conglomerate MCS supports both parties. This interpenetration of politics
and business further blurred the lines between the two main Mongolian
parties, contributing to the manan narrative.
ELECTORAL MANIPULATION
Among the most signiﬁcant events in the run-up to the 2016 parliamentary
elections was the passage of a new election law, which had been a bone of
contention since 1990. The difﬁculty was in deciding on the nature of the
electoral system (majoritarian or proportional), and the numbers of parlia-
mentary seats for the capital city versus the countryside (historically, the
capital was underrepresented in the number of seats per capita, and the fact
that the MPP performs much better than the DP in the countryside polit-
icized every effort to redress the imbalance). At last, in December 2011, the
parliament introduced a mixed system: 28 candidates would be selected from
the party lists, and the other 48 through the majoritarian system.18
Further changes were introduced on December 25, 2015, when the parlia-
ment adopted a new election law.19 Like the 2011 legislation, this latest law
provided for a mixed system, favoring smaller parties.20 Shortly thereafter,
Mongolian citizens D. Banzragch and Ts. Namsrai (until then unknown to
18. Law on Mongolian State Ikh Khural Election, 2011, <http://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/3
51?lawid¼351>, accessed October 2, 2016.
19. Law on Elections, <http://legalinfo.mn/law/details/11558?lawid¼11558>, accessed January 4,
2017.
20. Address by Speaker Z. Enkhbold, April 4, 2016, <http://www.parliament.mn/news/open/
categories/30/pages/28763>, accessed February 20, 2017.
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the public) petitioned the Constitutional Court, alleging that the mixed
electoral system violated the constitution, which calls for ‘‘direct’’ elections
of the parliament.21 The petitioners argued that the proportional element of
the 2015 law—election through ‘‘party lists’’—did not correspond to the
notion of ‘‘direct elections.’’ On April 22, 2016, the Constitutional Court
ruled that the proportional element contradicted the constitution. Former
President and now Court Justice Punsalmaa Ochirbat indicated that the
decision was not politically motivated. One of the petitioners, Banzragch,
denied that he had been under pressure or even in contact with any political
force (he admitted, though, to being anMPPmember). Still, there was plenty
of speculation, in particular among the smaller parties, that the Constitu-
tional Court’s decision was far from accidental. The decision blew a huge
hole in the ediﬁce of the new law on elections, when the election itself was less
than two months away.
The legality of the law on elections was not the only matter involving the
Constitutional Court in the months before the parliamentary elections.
There was also the spat between the court’s Chief Justice Jugnee Amarsanaa
and the Speaker Z. Enkhbold.22 The power struggle ended with the parlia-
ment voting in late February 2016 to dismiss Amarsanaa, leaving the Con-
stitutional Court without a chief justice. There were irregularities in the
method of Amarsanaa’s dismissal, but the decision stood. Considering that
the Amarsanaa case overlapped with the Constitutional Court’s discussion of
the election law, some observers speculated that the two issues were con-
nected. We were unable to establish any explicit connection. Amarsanaa
denied that the matter of his dismissal had anything to do with the new law.
The real signiﬁcance of Amarsanaa’s dismissal lies in the fact that it demon-
strated just how easily power-holders could subvert an important state insti-
tution, the Constitutional Court, in the pre-election period.
The Constitutional Court was not the only important state institution that
was usefully sidelined in the run-up to the elections. A similar fate befell the
powerful IAAC, whose head, Navaansuren Ganbold, was dismissed by the
21. S. Shiilegtumur, ‘‘D. Banzragch: bi khen negnii zakhialgaar Tsetsed khandaagui’’ [D.
Banzragch: I did not turn to the Constitutional Court on anyone’s order], Ardyn Erkh, April 18, 2016,
<http://eagle.mn/r/8924>, accessed October 22, 2017.
22. G. Uyanga, ‘‘J. Amarsanaa: Tsets, UIKH-yg Khyanadag . . . ’’ [J. Amarsanaa: the Constitu-
tional Court controls the Parliament . . . ], Olloo.mn, February 1, 2016, <http://www.olloo.mn/n/2
5429.html>, accessed September 27, 2016.
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parliament on April 14, without a replacement being appointed. Unlike
Amarsanaa, Ganbold asked to be relieved of his duties. Asked by MPs, he
repeatedly denied that he had been pressured to quit and disclaimed any role
in the police operation that targeted the powerful DP politician ‘‘Genko’’
Battulga, whose headquarters had been raided on April 11, 2016, in connec-
tion with an ongoing anticorruption investigation.23 That operation
prompted a protest by a small crowd of Battulga’s supporters and exposed
the deep ﬁssures inside the DP. State law enforcement agencies in Mongolia
have a record of investigating prominent politicians. The fact that these
politicians hailed from the ruling (rather than opposition) party would on
the surface speak to the proper operation of checks and balances, but, given
that the DP is riven by factions, it instead suggests how easily state institu-
tions can and are used and misused in factional struggle. The bottom line is
that, like Amarsanaa’s case, the Ganbold case was an instance of effective
decapitation of a powerful agency weeks before elections, which hints at
political meddling and points to the weakness of key institutions.
OnMay 5, 2016, the parliament voted to amend the law on elections which
it had passed only months earlier. Following the Constitutional Court’s
recommendation, the proportional element of the election was rendered null,
with all 76 seats to be contested in single-seat constituencies. The change led
to a chaotic situation, because the parliament now had to distribute the 28
seats that had been freed up by cancellation of the proportional element. The
initial task of drawing up constituencies fell to the General Election Com-
mission (GEC), which duly produced a list and passed it to the parliament on
May 11. When on the following day the Standing Committee on State
Organization, then chaired by the Democratic MP Agipar Bakei, discussed
the GEC draft, it quickly identiﬁed questionable provisions in the distribu-
tion of constituencies. For instance, Khentii aimag (province)—with its
46,589 registered voters—was assigned three constituencies, while the neigh-
boring aimag, Dornod (with 49,276 registered voters), was given only two. As
a result, Khentii ended up with one of lowest average numbers of voters per
constituency (16,539, 15482, and 14,586 for the three constituencies, whereas
the national average was 25,169).24
23. Minutes of the State Ikh Khural Session, April 14, 2016, <http://www.parliament.mn/ﬁles/
download/157717>, accessed January 26, 2017.
24. OSCE/ODIHR, ‘‘Interim Report on Mongolian Elections,’’ June 17, 2016, <http://www.
osce.org/odihr/elections/mongolia/247446>, accessed January 10, 2017.
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These problems did not go unnoticed by MPs from the opposition, who
questioned GEC Chairman Choinzon Sodnomtseren about the distribution,
but their objections were brushed off.25 The media speculated that the ‘‘real’’
reason for the GEC’s failure to apply a more equitable distribution was the
imperative of creating a constituency for the head of the DP faction in
parliament, Batkhuu Garamgaibaatar, who would otherwise face tough com-
petition from the MPP, which had a strong base in Khentii.26 Garamgaibaa-
tar himself justiﬁed the distribution, perhaps only half-jokingly, by referring
to the fact that Khentii aimag was the birthplace of Chinggis Khaan, and so
warranted a higher number of constituencies.
The State Committee on State Organization took the GEC draft and,
rather than addressing its inequities, made it much worse by introducing
arbitrary changes. Thanks to the relative transparency of the Mongolian
parliamentary debates, these changes can be easily documented. All of them
entailed further rearrangement of constituencies and redrawing of constitu-
ency boundaries. Among these was a proposal to move one constituency from
Sukhbaatar aimag into Uvs aimag, leading to deep population discrepancies.
Some constituencies were rearranged in ways that deﬁed geography, includ-
ing one in Uvs, which was divided up into four non-contiguous parts in the
east, the west, and the south of the aimag. Something similar happened in the
capital city of Ulaanbaatar, where Baganuur, a district on the eastern outskirts
of the city, was sliced up, and each slice connected to a different constituency
in the center of Ulaanbaatar.
The reasons for the carving up of constituencies were never openly spelled
out, but it’s easy enough to speculate who beneﬁted in each case. So, for
instance, in the case of Uvs aimag—perhaps the most blatant example—the
changes were probably meant to beneﬁt the prominent DP politician
N. Altankhuyag, who, having previously been elected from the party list, now
had to compete against the MPP in a single-mandate constituency. Similar
educated guesses may be made in every other case of changed constituency
25. Minutes of the Standing Committee on the State Organization, May 5, 2016, <http://www.
parliament.mn/sgh/sc/categories/174/pages/29400>; Minutes of the Parliamentary Session, May 12,
2016, <http://www.parliament.mn/sgh/p-session/categories/42/pages/29591>, both accessed August
9, 2016.
26. S. Bujin, ‘‘B. Garamgaibaatar: Bi Khentiid mandat nemsen, tegeed yaakh yum’’ [B. Gar-
amgaibaatar: I added a mandate in Khentii, so what?], Eagle.mn, May 12, 2016, <http://eagle.mn/r/10
631>, accessed October 22, 2017.
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borders. Each was approved by the committee’s vote, and then the general
session of the parliament. The MPP consistently voted against this, and was
equally consistently outvoted.
Gerrymandering is a common problem, even in much more stable dem-
ocratic polities than Mongolia. Indeed, the fact that people like Garamgai-
baatar and Altankhuyag failed to get elected despite blatant gerrymandering
would actually support the notion of the resilience of the Mongolian democ-
racy. Still, this gerrymandering represented a real effort to maximize the
chances of a political party that had a demonstrable legitimacy deﬁcit. The
ease with which the redrawing happened points to institutional weaknesses at
multiple levels: the GEC draft was already biased enough, but then more
biases were introduced before this draft was passed in the face of parliamen-
tary opposition and without public consultation. There were no checks and
balances to prevent it, which shows that the electoral process in Mongolia can
easily be subverted by a sufﬁciently determined political force. The fact that
the DP suffered a rout in spite of these manipulations does not mean that
there were serious institutional obstacles to such action, only that it was not
sufﬁciently determined or, indeed, united, as a political force.
The strangest part of the 2016 parliamentary elections was the 11th-hour
cancellation of the proportional element of the mixed system, which had
been in place since 2012. On April 25, days after the Constitutional Court
made the controversial decision, the DP’s faction in the parliament approved
of the changes.27 Although at the time it seemed like the DP was united in
this decision, there was in reality a serious debate inside the party, ending in
acrimony. At the meeting of the DP parliamentary faction, MP Arvin and
former prime minister Altankhuyag argued forcefully that the change would
play into the MPP’s hands. The MPP, Arvin argued, had always wanted small
majoritarian districts, simply because their local party work was on a much
better footing than the DP’s. Altankhuyag hinted at possible collusion
between the Constitutional Court and the MPP. There was a shouting match
between Altankhuyag, who opposed the court’s decision, and the Democratic
mayor of Ulaanbaatar, Erdene Bat-Uul, who supported it. Bat-Uul argued
that the DP stood to win from a purely majoritarian system, because in the
27. L. Enkhdelger, ‘‘AN: Tsetsiin dugneltiig khuleej avakh n’ zuitei’’ [DP: It is correct to accept
the Constitutional Court’s decision], Eagle News, April 25, 2016, <http://eagle.mn/r/9496>, accessed
October 22, 2017.
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elections it was not parties that mattered—each already had a ‘‘hard’’ follow-
ing that would vote for them no matter what—but the individual leaders of
the party. ‘‘I am the party leadership,’’ Bat-Uul replied to Altankhuyag’s
protests, telling him repeatedly to ‘‘be quiet.’’28 When at the end of the
meeting a vote was taken, 20 voted for the change and 14 against, while
Altankhuyag and MP Radnaasumberel Gonchigdorj just walked out, slam-
ming the door.29 The split in the DP ranks was also evident at the parlia-
mentary session on May 4, 2016, when Democratic MPs Garamgaibaatar and
Gonchigdorj criticized the Constitutional Court’s decision, and, in the lat-
ter’s case, argued that it was a result of political manipulation, involving the
MPP.30 These objections notwithstanding, the parliament passed amend-
ments to the law on elections in a bipartisan vote, setting the stage for the
redrawing of border constituencies.
The decision to scrap the proportional part of the law on elections deeply
affected smaller parties, which were weakly represented outside the capital
city. Thus, the new provisions effectively forced these parties to compete
against the big names from the DP and the MPP in Ulaanbaatar while leaving
the countryside to the major parties. Representatives of these smaller parties
vocally complained about the changes, arguing that they would undermine
the equality of political opportunity and reduce the diversity of Mongolia’s
political landscape. It was in this connection, too, that the notion of man-
an—the ‘‘fog’’—was given a new lease on life. The two main parties, the
MPP and the DP, so the argument went, were aware of their disastrous
standing in the public opinion polls, and so conspired to rig the system.
Using the Constitutional Court as a proxy, they created conditions for keep-
ing themselves in power. Such allegations are hard to prove or disprove.
The aforesaid leads to a number of conclusions. First, it is clearly not the
case that Mongolia enjoys stable institutions. The DP’s manipulation of the
electoral law, and the blatant gerrymandering, point in the opposite direc-
tion. The ruling party did everything in its power (short of outright falsiﬁ-
cation of the election results) to place itself in an advantageous position.
28. Mongolian Democratic Union, ‘‘Bat-Uul Facebook Tape Leak,’’ <https://www.facebook.
com/MongolianDemocraticUnion/videos/vb.203812716414598/976288882500307/>, accessed Sep-
tember 15, 2016.
29. Authors’ discussion with a DP insider.
30. Minutes of the State Ikh Khural Session, May 4, 2016, <http://www.parliament.mn/ﬁles/
download/158446>, accessed August 28, 2016.
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Second, the fact that it then was defeated on election day does not indicate
that the game was fair, only that the DP strategists made a bad miscalcula-
tion. Third, even as they tried to gain advantage, the Democrats remained
remarkably divided, with each faction aligning and realigning in ways that
reduced the opportunity for concerted subversion of the electoral process. In
a sense, what was bad for the party turned out to be a blessing for Mongolia’s
democracy. A party more interested in ﬁghting factional battles than main-
taining its hold on power, the DP proved to be much less of a menace than its
detractors believed.
THE ENKHBAYAR FACTOR
Before discussing Mongolia’s political developments since the parliamentary
elections, let us take an in-depth look at the third force in Mongolian politics,
the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. The ‘‘new’’ MPRP (to distin-
guish it from the MPRP of old, which is now the MPP) is led by former
President and MPP leader Enkhbayar, one of the most important political
personalities in Mongolia since the mid-1990s. At different times Enkhbayar
has served as chairman of the old MPRP, prime minister, speaker of the
parliament, and, ultimately Mongolia’s president, before losing to DP’s
Elbegdorj in the 2009 presidential election. Enkhbayar was later arrested
on charges of corruption and spent time in prison before being amnestied.
When in 2010 the old MPRP decided to shed the adjective ‘‘revolutionary’’
from its name, becoming the MPP, Enkhbayar took up the discarded name
and founded a new party, the new MPRP, which, like the MPP, traced its
genealogy back to socialist Mongolia’s ruling Communist Party.
Of course, by 2010 neither the MPP nor the new MPRP adhered to
anything remotely approaching communist ideology, though of the two,
Enkhbayar’s MPRP projected a more leftist image. As the economic situation
in Mongolia deteriorated in 2015–16, opinion polls began to show serious
gains in the MPRP’s standing. The Sant Maral barometer, for instance, listed
a 6.9% favorable rating for the party, not too far off the DP’s 13.1% and, more
relevantly, the MPP’s 14.3%.31 Meanwhile, Enkhbayar was consistently rated
one of the country’s most popular politicians. The Social Policy Development
31. Politbarometer No. 15 (49), March 2016, Sant Maral Foundation, <http://www.santmaral.mn/
sites/default/ﬁles/SMPBE16.Mar%20(updated).pdf>, accessed October 22, 2017.
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Research Institute (SPDRI) poll found that 12% favored him as their eventual
candidate for president (compared to 4% for theMPP Chair M. Enkhbold and
a meager 2% for the DP Chair Z. Enkhbold (not related to M. Enkhbold).32
Given such statistics, it is not surprising that Enkhbayar thought that the two
parties had conspired to keep him and his supporters out of power.33
That said, Enkhbayar himself was playing an intricate political game. In
late April 2016—just days before the Constitutional Court’s decision—he
held talks with the MPP on the possibility of forming an MPP/MPRP
coalition to contest in the elections. Needless to say, such an outcome would
have been fatal for the DP. On the other hand, if the MPRP were to run on
its own, it would have split the MPP’s vote, a highly desirable outcome from
the perspective of the ruling party. Enkhbayar knew his worth and negotiated
relentlessly. By April 18 an agreement was reached between the two parties
that the MPRP would nominate 25 of the 76 candidates, and the MPP, the
remaining 51.34 They also agreed that the two parties would rotate the posi-
tions of speaker and prime minister. On April 19, Enkhbayar and the MPP’s
M. Enkhbold held negotiations late into the night, but these ultimately
failed, because, according to Enkhbold, the former president was making
excessive demands. According to some MPP insiders, Enkhbayar never
wanted to be in a coalition as a junior partner. What he supposedly wanted
was to make himself more valuable vis-a`-vis the DP and extract one key
concession: that he himself would be allowed to stand in the elections.
Enkhbayar’s amnesty did not erase his criminal record, so, by the terms of
the existing criminal code, he was barred from standing, in spite of having
been released. Additional action from the DP-controlled parliament was
needed. This came in the form of a draft bill that was prepared just as the
MPP and the MPRP engaged in negotiations. The draft bill, which was only
passed by the Standing Committee, would have allowed Enkhbayar to run.35
In the end, it is quite possible that Enkhbayar, playing for high stakes, was
simply outplayed by the DP. He never was allowed to run in the elections,
32. Social Policy Development Research Institute opinion poll, March 2016 (unpublished; ob-
tained by the authors from the International Republican Institute).
33. Authors’ discussion with an MPRP insider.
34. L. Odonchimeg, ‘‘Yalbal UIKh-yn darga, Erunkhii saidad MAN, MAKhN-aas solibij ner
devshuulne’’ [If they win, the MPP and the MPRP will, in their turn, appoint the head of the
parliament and the prime minister], ITOIM, April 18, 2016, <http://itoim.mn/index.php/site/news/
4339>, accessed October 22, 2017.
35. ‘‘On the Measures to Implement the Law,’’ draft resolution of the Ikh State Khural (undated).
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despite staging a three-day hunger strike next to the General Election Com-
mission ofﬁces.
One unanticipated effect of the failure of the MPP and the MPRP to forge
a coalition was the remarkable defection of senior MPRP politicians, includ-
ing established ﬁgures like Chultem Ulaan, Dendev Terbishdagva, and the
banker Ochirbat Chuluunbat, to the MPP. (Something similar happened to
the Civil Will/Green Party, some of whose members defected to the DP.)
Such defection suggests, ﬁrst, that ideological differences along Mongolia’s
political spectrum are rarely so deep as to outweigh considerations of power.
Whether prominent politicians like Ulaan would have been able to get
elected on the MPRP ticket is an open question. The fact is that only one
MPRP candidate made it—Oktyabri Baasankhuu—and that mainly by a for-
tuitous alignment of circumstances. None of the other smaller parties had
their representatives elected. Second, this means that if the purpose of the
last-minute change to the majoritarian system was to deliver a fatal blow to
the smaller parties, then it certainly succeeded. But this requires the assump-
tion that the changes were politically motivated.
Finally, it is not unreasonable to argue that the MPRP saga was another
example of political factionalism. While it is true that the MPRP was
a party, not a faction, it was formed as a split-off from the MPP; at the
crucial moment, its key leaders defected to the MPP, and its chairman,
Enkhbayar, engaged in discussions with both of the main parties on issues
that had nothing to do with policy differences but that aimed at maximiz-
ing his own political inﬂuence. This all suggests that the MPRP is not so
much a party as a political faction, complete with its own patronage net-
work. The Enkhbayar factor played an even more signiﬁcant role in the
presidential election.
THE 2017 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The DP’s rout in the June 2016 parliamentary elections prompted soul-
searching and restructuring in the party. The ‘‘lesson’’ drawn from the defeat
was that the DP needed to become more open and transparent. Financial
ﬂows were to be reviewed to ensure that the ‘‘oligarchs’’ did not get to dictate
the party’s policies. Factions were to be rooted out. Prominent DP person-
alities Bat-Uul, Bat-Erdene Batbayar (a.k.a. Baabar), and Davaadorj Ganbold
argued in a passionate open letter that the party’s problem was that it was
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being run like a ‘‘maﬁa’’ or, indeed, a ‘‘feudal’’ clan.36 The responsibility for
the DP’s defeat, they argued, lay on the shoulders of the ‘‘faction leaders.’’
This was an ironic admission from people who had themselves played fac-
tional politics and, in Bat-Uul’s case speciﬁcally, forced the fateful decision to
change the election law, thus contributing to the DP’s dramatic defeat. If the
purpose of the open letter was to recapture leadership in the DP, then it did
not really work: these self-proclaimed founding fathers of the DP were being
gradually pushed out to the margins.
The struggle for leadership in the DP unfolded along two parallel tracks.
First, there was the race to capture the meager spoils of the parliamentary
elections, the post of parliament deputy chair, and the position of leader of
the party caucus (the DP won just enough seats to form a caucus). The
former went to Yadamsuren Sanjmyatav, of Altankhuyag’s Polar Star faction,
and the latter to ‘‘Genko’’ Battulga’s close associate Sodnomzundui Erdene,
who boasts ties to both the MDU and Shonkhor factions. So much, then, for
the death of factions. Second, on January 29, 2017, the DP conducted an
internal election to replace the party chairman. Z. Enkhbold, falling on his
sword, stepped aside. The race, which included prominent personalities such
as former Prime Minister N. Altankhuyag and younger politicians like Jal-
basuren Batzandan, was won by Erdene. The vote followed the party’s move
to create an electronic register of its members. The idea here was evidently to
democratize the party and facilitate public participation, but it also opened
the DP to allegations of manipulation. As there is no external oversight of the
‘‘electronic’’ register, these allegations continue to plague the party.
If Erdene’s election meant anything, it was that the Shonkhor and MDU
factions retained their considerable political inﬂuence, in spite of the setback
of the 2016 parliamentary election and the (almost as dramatic) failure to turn
the tide in the October 2016 local elections. And in spite of Z. Enkhbold’s
assurances that the inﬂuence of the ‘‘holders of offshore accounts’’ and the
‘‘oligarchs’’ on the DP had been ‘‘eradicated’’ in the reform, money continued
to play an important role in party politics.37 One of the candidates for the
36. ‘‘E. Bat-Uul, Baabar, Da. Ganbold nar AN-yn udirdlagyg buheld ni zaluu uedee shiljuulehiig
urialav’’ [E. Bat-Uul, Baabar, D. Ganbold asked to transfer DP authority completely to young
generation], Sonin.mn, July 7, 2016, <http://sonin.mn/news/politics-economy/65000>, accessed
August 27, 2017.
37. Z. Enkhbold’s speech at the 7th Party Congress, February 12, 2017, <http://www.demparty.
mn/news.php?nid¼415>, accessed August 27, 2017.
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party chairmanship, Batzandan, claimed at the time that the cost of nomi-
nation was 250 million tugrug (US$ 100,000).38 The party leadership contest
played out amid allegations of vote-buying. Even if these are hard to prove,
the party’s subsequent adoption of a ‘‘price list’’ for political positions—
advertised as an example of openness—in effect legitimized an entrenched
practice. For instance, the position of a soum (county) party head was priced
at 200,000 tugrug (US$ 80), while Ulaanbaatar’s party head was required to
contribute 90 million tugrug (US$ 37,000) to party coffers.39
Meanwhile, in May, the DP held a primary to nominate its presidential
candidate. The outcome was completely unexpected to most observers. The
leader of the MDU faction, ‘‘Genko’’ Battulga, defeated formidable oppo-
nents, including N. Altankhuyag (the Polar Star faction), former Justice
Minister Damba Dorligjav (who was backed by President Elbegdorj), and
the respected but notably factionless Rinchinnyam Amarjargal, another for-
mer prime minister. Once again, Battulga’s victory was accompanied by
allegations of manipulation and vote-buying. What followed was a reluctant
endorsement of Battulga’s candidacy by some of his rivals, including the
disgruntled Altankhuyag. The exceptions were Amarjargal, whose continued
neglect of factional politics helped marginalize him, and then-serving Presi-
dent Elbegdorj, who, though originally of the MDU faction, ended up being
deeply opposed to Battulga—so much so that the latter openly accused
Elbegdorj of subverting the party’s interests and conspiring with the rival
MPP to keep the Democrats out of politics. This conspiracy theory was
widely advertised in the presidential race in May–July 2017.40
The 2017 presidential election revealed that, far from being an ailment
speciﬁc to the DP, factionalism and patronage are deeply rooted across the
political spectrum, not excepting the ostensibly more uniﬁed MPP. It is true
38. M. Bulgan, ‘‘J. Batzandan: AN-yn dargad . . . ’’ [J. Batzandan: To Become the DP
Chairman . . . ], iToim, December 13, 2016, <http://itoim.mn/index.php/site/news/7481>, accessed
August 27, 2017.
39. ‘‘Ardchilsan Namyn Dotood Songuulyn Tuhai’’ [About the internal elections of the Dem-
ocratic Party], Mongolian Democratic Party, March 10, 2017, <http://www.demparty.mn/news.php?
nid¼435>, accessed August 27, 2017.
40. The conspiracy theory was prominently featured in the highly biased documentary, Children
of the Red Vaccine, that aired in Mongolia shortly before the presidential election. The documentary
was produced by Hero Entertainment, a company closely associated with ‘‘Genko’’ Battulga. See
Ulaan Tariany Khuukhduud (documentary), undated (May 2017), produced by Hero Entertainment,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼nf-CaiLQxvQ>, accessed October 22, 2017.
RADCHENKO AND JARGALSAIKHAN / THE BLESSINGS OF PATRONAGE IN MONGOLIA  1051
that the MPP did not have the sort of open bickering that characterizes the
DP. But there were nevertheless internal power shifts. The MPP-run cabinet
set up in the wake of the parliamentary election was headed by Jargaltulga
Erdenebat, a prote´ge´ of the party chairman, M. Enkhbold, and someone
without a political base of his own. The prime minister represented the
interests of Enkhbold’s powerful ‘‘city faction,’’ so named because of En-
khbold’s long service as the mayor of Ulaanbaatar. The most obvious reason
Enkhbold did not want to become prime minister himself and chose instead
to rule via a proxy was the prospect of losing the party chairmanship, and
with it, control over his increasingly fractious party.
The man appointed as Prime Minister Erdenebat’s deputy was Ukhnaa
Khurelsukh, whose support base is the party’s youth organization.41 Khur-
elsukh, as the representative of the party’s ‘‘have-nots,’’ aligned himself
politically with prominent MPP personality and former speaker Tsend
Nyamdorj, who on this occasion settled for serving as M. Enkhbold’s dep-
uty. It is not entirely clear why M. Enkhbold decided to seek presidential
nomination. But inasmuch as his (potential) election as president would
open up vacancies of both the party chair and the parliament speaker, it
created opportunities for other MPP have-nots, including Khurelsukh and
Nyamdorj. No one was surprised, then, that the MPP selected their party
leader as the nominee.
The third force contesting the presidential election was the MPRP, which
was eligible to nominate a candidate because it took one seat in the June 2016
elections. The MPP splinter, led by former President and Prime Minister N.
Enkhbayar, was never much more than his personal ﬁefdom. His inﬂuence in
the party was so considerable, and the party so small (particularly after some
of its most prominent personalities defected to the MPP in spring 2016), that
the MPRP stands apart from its rivals for its remarkable internal cohesion.
There were no contenders for the presidential nomination except for En-
khbayar himself. However, in both the 2016 and the 2017 elections, En-
khbayar’s nomination was rejected by the GEC. Unwilling to lose an
opportunity to prove his party’s viability, Enkhbayar brought in another
candidate, one who was not even an MPRP member but whose populist
views approximated Enkhbayar’s own: Sainkhuu Ganbaatar.
41. Khurelsukh has since become the prime minister (M. Enkhbold, as the loser in the election,
lost ‘‘his’’ prime minister).
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Ganbaatar, a former trade union leader and MP, was an unexpected
nominee—so unexpected that he himself had no idea he’d be running until
he was asked by Enkhbayar. The party chair overruled much more prominent
candidates, including former Foreign Minister Luvsan Erdenechuluun and
the lawyer Sodovsuren Narangerel. Surprised and unsettled by Enkhbayar’s
choice, the MPRP’s sole elected MP, Baasankhuu, reportedly explored the
prospect of nominating the marginalized DP heavyweight Amarjargal, but
Enkhbayar would have none of it. But the fact that a DP personality was even
being considered as a presidential candidate from the supposedly left-leaning
MPRP only serves to highlight the obvious irrelevance of ideology to Mon-
golian politics. Right, left, center—all of that hardly matters. The one thing
that does matter is one’s patronage network.
This became even clearer during the campaign itself. All three candidates
came up with ‘‘platforms’’ (though in Ganbaatar’s case, it was just a hastily
assembled list of bullet points), but the subsequent campaign featured almost
no discussion of economic or foreign policy. Instead, each of the candidates
tried to present the other two as deeply corrupt. This worked particularly well
for Ganbaatar, who hailed from the margins of Mongolian politics. He
successfully rehabilitated the manan narrative—the notion that the two main
parties were oligarchic structures that conspired to keep themselves in power
and to loot the State. As if to emphasize how different his own campaign was
from that of his rivals, Ganbaatar pioneered the idea of collecting campaign
donations through donation boxes, just a few thousand tugrug at a time.
Ganbaatar was certainly right that the two parties were oligarchic structures,
but they could never have conspired to do anything because of their bickering
and factionalism. But the message won a considerable following, which was
largely a reﬂection of the voters’ dissatisfaction with the direction of Mon-
golian politics. Ganbaatar’s standing was only partially undermined by
a leaked video that showed him accepting a bribe from a representative of
South Korea’s Uniﬁcation Church.
Meanwhile, ‘‘Genko’’ Battulga’s campaign message also hijacked the
ﬂawed manan narrative. It was particularly interesting in his case because,
unlike Ganbaatar, he did not hail from the margins: he was himself a promi-
nent DP personality and a faction leader! Moreover, his campaign was
endorsed and supported by other prominent politicians, including Z. En-
khbold and Altankhuyag, who had been in power just months prior. One of
the inﬂuential propaganda ﬁlms produced by Hero Entertainment, a studio
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reportedly linked to Battulga, made the fantastic claim that President Elbegdorj
linked up with theMPP and foreign interests to get theMPRP to nominate the
populist Ganbaatar, in order to split Battulga’s vote. In theMongolian context,
where ideology means so little and personal loyalty so much, these fantastic
scenarios were generally well received, as was Battulga’s skillful exploitation of
the allegation that M. Enkhbold was ethnically half-Chinese.
Fantasies aside, Battulga played one important card that probably contrib-
uted signiﬁcantly to his rival’s ultimate defeat. It entailed an audio recording
from a meeting, held in September 2014, at which the MPP’s M. Enkhbold
spoke about the prospects of selling government positions to raise some 60
billion tugrug (US$ 25,000,000). The audio was ﬁrst leaked prior to the 2016
parliamentary elections but obviously did not help the struggling DP; but
now that the MPP and M. Enkhbold were actually in power, it suddenly
acquired greater signiﬁcance. Ironically, every knowledgeable Mongolian
understands that this is exactly how the patronage system works: money is
involved at every stage, no matter whether the DP or the MPP runs the
government. But M. Enkhbold’s considerable appetites, and the hard evi-
dence in the form of an ostensibly authentic audio ﬁle, added credence to the
DP’s allegations and also supported Ganbaatar’s narrative. Unexpectedly,
M. Enkhbold nearly lost to Ganbaatar in the ﬁrst round of voting (on June
26) and lost badly to Battulga in the second round, on July 7. After their
tremendous defeat at the polls just a year earlier, the Democrats regained
a degree of conﬁdence.
CONCLUSION
The 2016–17 electoral cycle was a political roller coaster for Mongolia. The
DP, as the ruling party, was badly defeated in the parliamentary elections,
only to make an unexpected comeback in the presidential race. This article
has explored how and more importantly why it happened, and with what
consequences for Mongolia’s democracy. Overall, the consequences are
rather more positive than negative. Contrary to the fears voiced in many
quarters, Mongolia has not retreated to some form of autocracy. It is, for all
intents and purposes, the only stable democracy in a highly autocratic neigh-
borhood. The peaceful transfer of power from the DP to the MPP, and then
the election of a DP-backed president, thus provide causes for celebration.
Peaceful transfers of power tend to strengthen the democratic system.
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In many ways, though, the year witnessed considerable political turbu-
lence. It highlighted how easily—given the political will—Mongolia’s insti-
tutions can be manipulated. The last-minute changes in the law on elections,
the redrawing of constituencies a few weeks before the parliamentary elec-
tions, the failure to ensure the GEC’s independence, the decapitation of the
Constitutional Court and the IAAC, the use of administrative resources,
widespread instances of vote-buying, populist rhetoric: all these give rise to
serious concerns. Plus, Mongolia is going through its worst economic down-
turn in years. And yet, in spite of all these challenges, the system has dem-
onstrated a surprising degree of robustness. The question is why.
This is the question we asked ourselves, after midnight on June 30, 2016,
standing among reporters in the tightly packed hall of the DP headquarters,
as Z. Enkhbold conceded his party’s defeat. This is the question we asked
a year later, when the MPP’s M. Enkhbold was defeated by a Democratic
rival—and readily accepted the result. Did these acceptances reﬂect that
Mongolian leaders were committed to the democratic process? This inter-
pretation was championed by the former mayor of Ulaanbaatar, Bat-Uul.
The main political parties, Bat-Uul said, are no longer in conﬂict about
democracy: both are committed to elections.42 Accepting results—even
extremely unfavorable results—means forgoing the option that must be pre-
sumed to be available in institutionally weak regimes: to stall, falsify, or resort
to force to keep power. But the Mongolian elites are averse to the use of force;
the one time it happened—following the July 2008 parliamentary elections—
the ruling party’s legitimacy was badly undermined. The shock of 2008 has
not yet worn off.
Yet Bat-Uul’s comments obscure a rather more complicated picture. Lead-
ers of both major parties may believe that they are themselves committed to
democracy, but they do not necessarily believe this of their opponents. Before
their victory in the 2016 elections, M. Enkhbold and other prominent MPP
personalities highlighted the importance of democratic values but pressed the
point that the DP was undermining them. The narrative was then adopted by
the DP, and its nominee Battulga, who was nearly resigned from the start that
the election would be rigged, only to win it. The same was true of Enkhbayar,
who was himself perceived at one time as Mongolia’s potential ‘‘strongman,’’
and of his nominee, Ganbaatar. Both claimed that the power-holders—ﬁrst
42. ‘‘Bat-Uul Facebook Tape Leak.’’
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the Democrats, and then the MPP—conspired to steal their victory at the
polls through vote-buying or outright manipulation of the electronic voting
equipment. At least Enkhbayar and Ganbaatar are consistent in their claims,
but the MPP and the DP forgot about their grievances the moment they
scored their wins in the parliamentary and the presidential elections, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, the idea that the ruling party—whichever party it may
be—is actively seeking to undermine democratic governance is deeply
entrenched in the Mongolian opposition.
In this article we have argued that this scenario has failed to materialize,
due to rampant factionalism across the Mongolian political spectrum. Over-
lapping patronage networks run deep, bridging (largely imaginary) ideolog-
ical divides. Political power is dispersed among factions, and no one has been
in a position to achieve political dominance, neither under the DP, nor even
under the ostensibly more uniﬁed MPP. Patronage and factionalism—and
the diffusion of power they produce—continue to nourish the Mongolian
‘‘democratic oasis.’’
One could argue that patronage and factionalism are nothing unusual and
that they do not necessarily result in democracy. They are pervasive in
Central Asia, and yet most Central Asian countries are anything but demo-
cratic.43 Still, Kyrgyzstan presents an interesting counterpart case, though
Kyrgyz politics are even more intractable because of the inﬂuence of clan
politics and ethnic differences that are not so important in Mongolia. Like
Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan is not known for rock-solid institutions, and the pro-
visional survival of the limping Kyrgyz democracy depends on alternative
explanations. Our approach presents an alternative to an oligarchic politics
model (the centerpiece of the manan narrative), because unlike the latter, it
allows for moments of complete rout of one or another political force, as
happened during the 2016–17 electoral cycle.
A very interesting Mongolian analogy can help explain how these patron-
age networks work. The term bruited on many occasions is ‘‘horse racing’’
(mori uralduulakh). Politicians were seen as horses, and those who bid on
them stood to beneﬁt from the outcome of the race. We have tried to show
that such ‘‘bidding’’ was a complex process. Family ties, old-boy networks,
43. Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Eric Max McGlinchey, Paying for Patronage: Regime Change in Post-Soviet
Central Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Sally Cummings, ed., Power and
Change in Central Asia (London: Routledge, 2004).
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and other types of relationships were brought into play, and often the bidders
had more than one ‘‘horse’’ in the race, not always from the same party. The
existence of these multiple overlapping networks constrains the winners and
reassures the losers, making it easier to arrange for peaceful transfers of power.
The networks also provide a degree of conﬁdence in the system should the
Mongolian Constitution be amended (as is now increasingly likely) to
strengthen the presidency or (more probably) the parliament. Even when
formal checks and balances fail, informal checks and balances should gener-
ally prevent the concentration of power in anyone’s hands.
Yet the system is not foolproof. The danger is that over the long term
factional strife cannot prevent a determined political player from outplaying
the others. Only strong institutions can. In this sense, the recent electoral
cycle undermined democratic governance. Indeed, the signiﬁcant irregulari-
ties and rampant corruption recounted above widened the boundaries of the
politically acceptable, eroding public trust. The bar was lowered in 2016–17,
and the peaceful transfer of power does not raise it back up. So while the
2016–17 electoral cycle was not necessarily a step back for Mongolian democ-
racy, it was not a step forward either. It was a step sideways. Both the DP and
the MPP will have to work hard to strengthen Mongolia’s institutions and
demonstrate respect not just for the letter but also for the spirit of the law.
Only this—and not the mantra about Mongolia’s long-standing commit-
ment to democracy—can safeguard the country against backsliding toward
a political model that is more in line with the preferences of its unfortunate
neighborhood.
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